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We develop a North-South model of foreign aid and cross-border pollution
resulting from production activities in the recipient country. There is both
private and public abatement of pollution, the latter being financed through
emissions tax revenue and  foreign  aid. We characterise a Nash
equilibrium where the donor country chooses the amount of aid, and the
recipient chooses the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement
and/or the emission tax rate. At this equilibrium, an increase in the donor's
perceived rate of cross-border pollution reduces net emission levels.
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In recent years, policy makers and environmental activists have been voicing
strong concerns against the  widespread environmental degradation due to the
intensification of economic activity.  More often than not, the externalities associated
with pollution are not confined to a particular country or region. For this reason, the issue
of cross-border (or, transboundary) pollution has been the subject of discussion in many
international fora, and it is widely acknowledged that concerted international actions are
necessary to deal with the problem. It is also accepted that the developing countries need
help from the developed ones in order for the former to pursue environmental-friendly
policies.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a positive aspect of the international
dimension of pollution. In particular, we consider a scenario in which pollution knows no
international boundary and the developed countries provide aid to the developing
countries to help the latter with pollution abatement. In this scenario, we show that an
increase in the developed world’s perception of the effect of cross-border pollution will
in fact reduce the total amount of pollution emission in the developing world.
In the literature on environment and the international economy, international trade
and trade policies play key roles (see, for example, Copeland (1994) and Beghin et al
(1997)).
1 In our analysis, international linkages come via cross-border pollution and
transfers. We assume both countries to be small open economies so that the commodity
prices are exogenous and we do not consider trade polices. Instead, we allow the donor
country to determine endogenously the amount of aid, and the recipient country is free to
choose the emission tax rate and how much of the aid it wants to allocate for public
abatement of pollution.
2 In other words, we assume that the developed country applies
"carrots" in the form of foreign aid rather than "sticks" such as trade sanctions, in order to
persuade the developing countries to follow sensible environmental polices.
                                                                
1 For an extensive survey of the earlier literature on environmental policies, see Cropper and Oats (1992).
2 Implicitly, we assume that the donor cannot tie aid to pollution abatement, i.e. aid is perfectly fungible.
This assumption is consistent with the findings of many empirical studies that aid is, for all intents and
purposes, highly fungible (see, for example, Pack and Pack (1993) and Khilji and Zampelli (1994)).3
There is a substantial literature on the economics of cross-border pollution. For
example,  Merrifield (1988) in a two-country general equilibrium model with
internationally mobile goods, capital and pollution flows, examines the welfare effects of
selected abatement strategies (e.g., production taxes, abatement equipment standards).
Ludema and Wooton (1994) develop a two-country model with production generated
pollution in the exporting country and cross-border pollution externalities. Within this
framework, they examine the welfare effects of environmental policies (e.g., adoption of
pollution abating technology) vis-a-vis trade policies ( e.g., reduction of import tariffs)
when the two countries either can non-cooperatively restrict trade, or when they are
bound by a free trade agreement. Ludema and  Wooton (1997) extend their previous
theoretical framework by incorporating administrative costs and asymmetric information
in pollution abatement (known only to the exporting country), in order to examine the
welfare implications of  cooperative and non-cooperative trade and environmental
policies. Copeland and Taylor (1995) consider a model of a world economy consisting of
two regions --North and South-- each composed of many countries. Governments set
national pollution quotas treating the rest of the world’s pollution as given. They
demonstrate, inter alia, that reduction in pollution by a coalition of countries may be
Pareto improving and that income transfers tied to pollution reduction can be welfare
enhancing. On the other hand, untied income transfers may not have an impact on global
pollution, terms of trade and levels of national welfare. Copeland (1996), in a two
country model of cross-border pollution, examines the effectiveness of a “pollution
content tariff”, i.e. an import tariff whose magnitude varies with the amount of pollution
generated by the production of the imported good.
In the bulk of the relevant literature, it is assumed that all abatement activities are
carried out by private agencies. Khan (1995) considers the other extreme where pollution
abatement is entirely provided by a central agency ( e.g., government).  Chao and  Yu
(1999) examine the welfare implications of foreign aid tied to pollution abatement, in the
context of a two-country general equilibrium trade model where pollution is generated in
and inflicted upon the aid-receiving country only. In their model, private sectors
undertake abatement in response to emission taxes, and, on the top of it, the public sector
carries out further abatement with the help of foreign aid. They examine the welfare4
effects of an exogenous increase in foreign aid. We follow  Chao and  Yu (1999) in
considering the co-existence of private and public abatement of pollution. However, the
relationship between the two papers ends with that, both in terms of the model
formulation and the analysis.
The model is spelt out in the following section. Section 3 carries out the welfare
analysis. The Nash equilibrium is characterised in section 4, which also carries out the
main exercise of the paper, i.e. the effect of a change in the donor’s perceived rate of
cross-border pollution on net emission of pollution. Finally, some concluding remarks are
made in section 5.  
2. The Model
In our model there are two small open economies  --a developed donor and a
developing recipient country. Pollution takes place in the recipient country, as a by-
product of production. For simplicity, we assume that no pollution is generated  in the
donor country. However, pollution created in the recipient country finds its way to the
developed country, and the latter suffers disutility from this cross-border pollution.
In both countries, a number of goods, which are freely traded in the international
market, are produced. The endowments of the internationally immobile factors of
production are inelastically supplied and the factor markets are perfectly competitive. In
the recipient country, both the private producers and the public sector take part in
pollution abatement. The private producers do so in response to an emission tax, t, and
the public sector abates some of the remaining pollution with the help of emission tax
revenue and foreign aid. The private and the public sectors compete in the factor market
on equal terms. The total factor endowment vector, V, in the recipient country can be
decomposed into the part that is used in the private sector, V
p, and the part that used in the
public abatement activities,  V
g, i.e.  V=V
p+V
g. The gross domestic product, or the
restricted revenue function,  R(P, t,  V
p), which is  the country’s maximum value of
domestic production of private goods, is defined as
)}, ( ) , ( : ' { max ) , , ( ,
p
z x
p V T z x tz x P V t P R ˛ - =5
where  P is the vector of world commodity prices, T (V
p) is the country's aggregate
technology set and x and z are respectively the vector of net outputs and the amount of
pollution emission. The technology set includes pollution abatement technologies in the
various sectors. For a given level of abatement carried out by the public sector g, the
vector of factor uses in the public sector V
g and therefore V
p are uniquely determined.
Moreover, since P does not vary in our analysis, the revenue function can be written as
R(t,g).
The  R t g ( , )function is strictly convex in the effluent tax rate (i.e.,  Rtt > 0),
implying that an increase in the emissions tax rate lowers the amount of pollution
emissions by the private sector, and for the rest of the analysis we assume that  Rgg = 0.
3
It is well known (see, for example, Abe (1992)) that  )] ( ) / ( [ w C g R R
g
g = ¶ ¶ - = -  is the
unit cost of public pollution abatement, where (w) is the vector of factor returns.  It is also
well known (see, for example, Copeland (1994)) that
) , ( t g R z t - =                                                                                                          (1)
is the amount of pollution emissions by the private sectors. Therefore, taking both public
and private abatement of pollution, the net emission of pollution, r, is defined as
r z g R g t g t = - = - - ( , ) .                                                                                      (2)
We also assume that  0 ) / ( > ¶ -¶ = g z Rtg . That is, an increase in the government
provided pollution abatement reduces emission by the private sector. The justification for
this assumption is as follows. Heuristically speaking, if g increases, the supply of factor
endowments available for the production of the private goods becomes lower. This means
                                                                
3 This assumption implies that changes in (g), which change factor supplies available to produce private
goods, do not affect its unit cost of production. For example, in a conventional H-O model, factor prices are
determined by commodity prices and are independent of changes in factor endowments. Thus, when (g)
changes then  0 ) ( = - = gg
g
g R w C . Abe (1992), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995) use this assumption
in an alternative framework. Chao and Yu (1999) use the same assumption in a context similar to the one
presented here.6
that, on the  whole, private production  is reduced, which in turn implies that  total
pollution (i.e.,  t R - ) falls, i.e.,  0 / ) ( < - = ¶ - ¶ tg t R g R  or  0 > tg R .
Turning to the demand side in the recipient economy, the expenditure function
E r u ( , )denotes the minimum expenditure required to achieve a level of utility u at the
prevailing commodity prices,
4 when the level of net pollution is r. The partial derivative
of the expenditure function with respect to u ( Eu) denotes the reciprocal of marginal
utility of income. Since pollution adversely affects household utility, the partial
derivative of the expenditure function with respect to r ( r E ) is positive and denotes the
households' marginal willingness to pay for the reduction in pollution (e.g., see Chao and
Yu (1999)). That is, a higher level of pollution requires a higher level of spending on
private goods to mitigate its detrimental effects in order to maintain a constant level of
utility. The expenditure function is assumed to be strictly convex in r,  0 > rr E .  That is, a
higher level of net pollution raises the households’ marginal willingness to pay for its
reduction.
As for the recipient country government’s budget constraint, we assume that the
government finances the cost of publicly provided abatement (i.e.,  ) , ( t g gR gC g
g - = ) by
using a fraction  0 1 < < b of foreign aid provided by the donor country,
  5 and the entire
revenue raised from emission tax revenue (i.e.,  ) , ( t g tR tz t - = . Thus, the government’s
budget constraint can be written as:
= + + ) , ( t g gR tz T g b . 0 ) , ( ) , ( = + - t g gR t g tR T g t b                      (3)
The description of the aid-receiving pollution-emitting country is completed by
writing its income-expenditure identity. The country’s budget constraint requires that
private spending (E r u ( , )) must equal income from the production of private goods
(R g t ( , )) and from publicly provided pollution abatement (- gR g t g( , )) plus the fraction
                                                                
4 For reasons mentioned before, prices are omitted from the arguments of the expenditure function.
5 Our assumption that  1 < b implies that the recipient government is not required to provide matching
funds for pollution abatement.7
of aid distributed to domestic households in a lump-sum manner (( ) 1-b T). Using
equation (2), the recipient country’s budget constraint can be written as:
E r u R g t tR g t T t ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) = - + .                                                                           (4)
Turning to the donor country, as noted before we assume that it does not generate
any pollution. The utility of this country, however, is affected adversely by cross-border
pollution originated in the recipient country (i.e. r). Denoting by  q the perceived degree
of cross-border pollution, the welfare of the donor country is affected adversely by the
perceived amount of cross-border pollution  r q .
6 Therefore,  the country’s income-
expenditure identity requires that private spending, denoted by the expenditure function
), , (
* * u r E q  must equal revenue from production of the private goods, 
* R , minus the
amount of foreign aid transferred to the recipient country. That is,
T R u r E - =
* * * ) , (q .                                                                                              (5)
As before Eu
*denotes the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income in the donor
country, and we assume that  Err
* > 0. Since the commodity prices are exogenous, the
factors of production are  inelstically supplied, and there is no pollution or pollution
abatement --- private or public --- in the donor country, 
* R is exogenous to our analysis.
Equations (1)-(4) constitute a system of four equations in terms of the four
primary unknowns, namely  u u g , ,
* and  z. The model contains one policy parameter for
the donor country, namely the amount of foreign aid  ( ) T , and two for the recipient
country: the fraction of foreign aid allocated to pollution abatement (b) and the
emissions tax rate ( ) t .
                                                                
6 See Ishikawa and Kiyono (2000) for the concept of perceived degree of cross-border pollution.8
3. Welfare Effects in the Recipient and Donor Countries
In this section we characterize the Nash optimal levels of the policy parameters
under a number of scenarios, depending on the scope of the instruments. First of all
differentiating equations (1)-(4), we obtain changes in the level of welfare in the donor
and the recipient countries as follows:
7
dt A d A dT A du E t T u + + = D b b ,             (6)
q b q b d C dt C d C dT C du E t T u + + + = D
* * ,                                                             (7)
where  ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( g tg r tg T R tR E R A - - + + = b b >0,    ] ) 1 [( tg g r tg tR R E R T A - + + = b ,
) ( ] ) 1 )[( ( t R R E tR R E R gR z A g tt r tg g r tg gt t + - - + + + = ,   g tg R tR - = D >0,
) ( ) 1 (
*
g R tR E R C tg r tg T - - + = bq ,  ) 1 (
*
tg r R E T C + = q b >0,
)] ( ) )( 1 [(
* t R R gR z R E C g tt gt tg r t + - + + =q ,  and  ) (
*
g tg r R tR rE C - - = q <0.
8
Before explaining the above equations, it may be helpful to explain how the policy
parameters affect the level of net emission. These are found to be:
dt gR z R t R R d R T dT R dr gt tg g tt tg tg )] )( 1 ( ) ( [ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + + - + + + - + - = D b b .        (8)
It is clear from equation (8) that an increase in  T orb, as one would expect,
unambiguously reduces net pollution. However, an increase in t has an ambiguous effect
on net emission. An increase in  t reduces pollution emission by the private sector.
However, a reduction in pollution emission by the private sector reduces the tax base for
public sector abatement. The net effect of an increase in t on net emission is therefore
ambiguous.
Turning to the effects on welfare levels, since  Rtg>0 and  Rg<0, the term  T A is
positive and therefore aid unambiguously improves welfare in the recipient country.
                                                                
7 The system of basic equations for deriving these is stated in the matrix form in the Appendix.
8 Note that a change in q has no direct effect on u.9
There is a direct positive effect due to the transfer per se, and an indirect positive effect
( r tg E R ) 1 ( + b ). The expression  T C in equation (7) indicates that for the donor country,
foreign aid has an ambiguous effect. That is, aid induces the direct negative effect due to
the income transfer, but so long as a fraction is spent on pollution abatement (i.e.  0 > b ),
there is a positive indirect impact  ( r tg E R ) 1 ( + b ) on the donor’s welfare. The expression
b A  and At are ambiguous in sign. An increase in either t or  b on one hand reduces
pollution, but on the other hand takes resources away from the private sector to the public
sector, reducing private income. An increase in  b reduces net pollution and thus, as
indicated by the term  b C , unambiguously improves welfare of the donor country. The
term  t C  indicates that an increase in t has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the
donor country. This is because, as noted before, an increase in t has an ambiguous effect
on the level of net emission.
Finally, as shown by the term  q C , an increase in the perceived rate of cross-
border pollution  ( ) q  in the donor country exerts a detrimental effect on the donor
country’s welfare level, while it has no direct effect on the welfare level in the recipient
country.
Turning now to the equilibrium choice of the instruments, we assume that the
donor decides on the amount of aid (T), while the recipient selects the proportion  ( ) b of
aid allocated to pollution abatement and the rate of emission tax (t). We assume that the
two countries behave non-cooperatively (Nash), so that the first order conditions are
given by:
, 0 ) / (
* * = = D T u C dT du E                                                                                       (9)
             , 0 ) / ( = = D b b A d du Eu                                                                                        (10)
. 0 ) / ( = = D t u A dt du E                                                                          (11)
Equations (9), (10) and (11) simultaneously determine the optimal values of T,  b
and t. Having obtained the optimality conditions, we examine the effect of an increase in10
the perception parameter q on the level of net emission r. To this end we differentiate
(9)-(11) and using (6)-(8), we obtain
q b q b d C dt C d C dT C T Tt T TT - = + +                                                                                 (12)
0 = + + dt A d A dT A t T b bb b b ,                                                                                          (13)
0 = + + dt A d A dT A tt t tT b b .                                          (14)
where
9
* 2 2 1 ) 1 ( rr tg TT E R C + D - =
- q b ,  )] )( 1 ( ) ( 1 [ ) 1 (
* * 1 *
rr ru tg r tg T R r T E R C h qh b q b - + D + + =
- ,
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
* * 1
rr ru t tg Tt C R r C h qh b - + D =
- ,     ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* *
ru r tg T E R C qh b q - + = ,
] ) 1 ( )[ 1 (
1 1
rr tg u ru T tg T E R E E A R T A A + - + D + =
- - b b b ,    rr tg E R T A
2 2 1 ) 1 ( + D - =
-
bb ,
rr g tt gt tg tg t E t R R gR z R R T A )] ( ) )( 1 )[( 1 (
1 + - + + + D - =
-
b ,
)] ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 )][( ( ) )( 1 [(
1
rr ru r tg ru g tt gt tg tT E R r E t R R gR z R A h h b b - + D + - + - + + =
- ,
tt r tg rr g tt gt tg tt tt R E R E t R R gR z R A R T A ) 1 ( )] ( ) )( 1 [(
2 1 1 + - + - + + D - - =
- -
b ,
  ), / ( u ru ru E E r = h   ) / ( r rr rr E E r = h ,  ), / (
* * *
u ru ru E E r = h   ) / (
* * *
r rr rr E E r = h .
Having obtained the general expression for changes in the policy variables, we shall
now examine the effect of a change in  q on the level of net emission r, under a number
of special cases.
3.1 A Benchmark Case: Passive Recipient
First, we consider a case where the donor government optimally chooses the amount
of foreign aid ) (T , but the recipient government treats  ) , ( t b as exogenous. In this case,
the effect of a change in the perceived rate ) (q  of cross-border pollution on net pollution
is given by:11
= ) / ( q d dr = ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ )] / )( / ( ) / [( q q d dT T r r ) / )( 1 (
1 q b d dT Rtg + D -
- ,              (15)
where  0 ) / ( = ¶ ¶ q r  and   ) / ( T r ¶ ¶  is  given by equations (8). Equation (15) indicates that
a higher value of  q reduces net emission if and only if it increases the amount of the
transfer. In order to find the effect on transfer, letting  0 = = dt db  in equation (12), we
get:
1 * * * 1 ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ) / (
- - + - D = rr tg r ru E R E d dT q h q ,                                                              (16)
where  ) / (
* * *
u ru ru E rE = h is the donor country’s marginal propensity to pay for pollution
abatement. Since it is natural to assume that the consumers will not be willing, at the
margin, to pay more than their additional income for pollution abatement, we assume that
. 1
* < ru h  It then immediately follows from (15) and (16) that an increase in  q
unambiguously reduces net emission.
Proposition 1: Consider two countries, a donor that optimally chooses the amount of
aid, and a recipient pollution-emitting that uses a fixed fraction of aid and pollution tax
revenue, at a constant tax rate, to finance pollution abatement. Then, an increase in the
donor’s perceived rate of cross-border pollution, unambiguously raises the amount of
foreign aid, and reduces the level of net emission.
The intuition of this result can be as follows. An increase in  q increases the marginal
benefit of aid as the recipient country spends a positive fraction of it on pollution
abatement. This induces the donor to increase the amount of aid, and thus reducing net
emission level.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
9 Note that CTT<0 and  bb A <0, and therefore the respective welfare functions are concave in T and  b. A
sufficient condition for Att to be negative is that  0 ‡ b A . Note also that third derivatives are assumed zero.12
3.2 The Case of Nash Equilibrium
Next we consider the case in which the donor, as before, decides on the level of
aid, and the recipient chooses the instruments at its disposal. We consider three sub-cases
depending on the instruments the recipient decides to use.
Case 1: The donor country optimally chooses the amount of foreign aid (T), and the
recipient sets optimally the fraction  ) (b of foreign aid allocated to pollution abatement.
The emission tax rate (t) is assumed to be exogenous.
In this case, the effect of a change in q on net emission is given as:
= ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ = ) / )( / ( ) / )( / ( ) / ( q b b q q d d r d dT T r d dr
)] / ( ) / ( [ ) 1 (
1 q b q b d d T d dT Rtg + D + -
- ,                                     (17)
where the expressions for  ) / ( T r ¶ ¶ and  ) / ( b ¶ ¶r are given in (8). Equation (17) indicates
that if  q raises foreign aid and its fraction allocated to pollution abatement in the
recipient country (i.e. if  0 ) / ( > q d dT and  0 ) / ( > q b d d ), then it will reduce emission,
i.e.  0 ) / ( < q d dr .
The Nash equilibrium in this case is derived by setting  0 = T C  and  0 = b A .
Totally differentiating these two equations, we can solve for the effects on T and  b as:
bb q q A C d dT T - = W ) / ( , and                                                                                (18)
q b q b T TC A d d = W ) / ( ,                                                                                         (19)
where  ) ( b b bb T T TT C A C A - = W > 0 for stability of the system.
10
From (18) it is clear that an increase in the perception parameter  q
unambiguously increases aid, as in the previous case. But, the effect on  b is ambiguous.
In particular, if the marginal propensity to pay for the pollution abatement is very small in
                                                                
10 See, for example, Takayama (1985), pp. 313-319.13
the recipient country, we have 0 < T Ab , and therefore an increase in  q will reduce  b.
The intuition is simple. If the marginal propensity to pay for pollution abatement is small,
the recipient government would allocate a smaller proportion of aid to public abatement
and thus increasing the activities of the private sector.
Next, substituting equation (18) and (19) into (17), and after some manipulations,
we get
= ) / ( q d dr ru T tg E C R T q
1 3 2 ) ( ) 1 (
- DW + - ,                                                            (20)
Equation (20) shows that an increase in  q unambiguously reduces net emission,
regardless of its ambiguous effect on  b.
Case 2: The donor country optimally chooses the amount of foreign aid (T), and the
recipient sets optimally the emission tax rate  ) (t . The fraction of foreign aid allocated to
pollution abatement  ) (b  is set exogenously.
The Nash equilibrium in this case is derived by setting  0 = T C and 0 = t A . Differentiating
these equilibrium conditions, we obtain:
tt T A C d dT q q - = W ) / ( 1 , and                                                                                (21)
q q T tT C A d dt = W ) / ( 1 ,                                                                                          (22)
where  ) ( 1 Tt tT TT tt C A C A - = W >0 for the stability of the system.
Since Att <0 and  0 > q T C , it follows from (21) that an increase in q increases the
optimal level of aid. However,  AtT, and therefore  q d dt / , cannot be signed
unambiguously. Using the Nash equilibrium conditions, the expression for AtT can be
simplified as:
] ) ( ) 1 ( [ ) (
1 1 1 - - - D + + + - + = u ru rr tg r gt tT E E A T E R E gR z A b b b .14
From the above expression it is clear that AtT, and therefore  q d dt / , are negative
if the marginal propensity to pay for pollution abatement in the recipient country is very
small. The intuition is similar to that given for  q b d d /  in the previous case. The effect on
net emission in this case is given by:
= ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ = ) / )( / ( ) / )( / ( ) / ( q q q d dt t r d dT T r d dr
) / ( ) ( ) / ( ) 1 (
1 1 q q b d dt E gR z d dT R r gt tg
- - + - D + - ,                     (23)
where the expressions for  ) / ( T r ¶ ¶ and  ) / ( t r ¶ ¶ are given in equation (8).
11 Substituting
(21) and (22) into (23), we get:
= + - + D W =
- - ] ) ( ) 1 ( [ ) / (
1 1
1 tT r gt tt tg T A E gR z A R C d dr b q q
ru r gt u ru r gt tt tg T E E gR z E E E gR z R R A T C
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 ) ( ) ( ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( [ {
- - - - - + D - + + + D - W b q b
} ) 1 (
2 1
tt r tg R E R + D -
- b .                                                                          (24)
Unlike in the previous two cases, the effect on net emission is no longer
unambiguous. However, a sufficient condition for the effect to be negative is that  b A is
non-negative. However, if the marginal propensity to pay for pollution abatement is small
and  b A  is negative, an increase in q may increase net emission. Note that  b A is negative,
when the exogenously given value of  b is higher than the optimal one. It is also to be
noted that a higher  b means more resources are spent in the public sector at the expense
of the private one. In this case, therefore, the recipient government redresses this
imbalance by reducing emission tax rate and thus increasing net emission.
                                                                
11 Using 0 = t A , it can be shown that  . 0 ) ( )] ( ) )( 1 [(
1 > D + = + - + +
-
r gt g tt gt tg E gR z t R R gR z R15
Case 3: The donor country optimally chooses the amount of  ) (T , and the recipient
country optimally sets both the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement  ) (b , and
the emission tax rate  ) (t .
In this case, the Nash equilibrium is obtained by setting  0 = = = T t C A A b .
Differentiating these equations, we get:
) ( ) / ( t t tt T A A A A C d dT D b b bb q q - - = ,                                                                 (25)
) ( ) / ( tT t T T A A A A C d dt D bb b b q q - - = ,                   (26)
) ( ) / ( tT t T tt T A A A A C d d D b b q q b - = ,                  (27)
where  D is the determinant of the matrix of coefficients for  b d dT , and  dt in equations
(12)-(14). Stability requires that  D  is negative. Note that the equilibrium conditions in
this case, i.e. 0 = = = T t C A A b , imply that  t R E g r = - = , and thus the expressions of the
individual coefficients on the right hand sides are simplified as:
      = T Ab ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 (
1 1
rr tg u ru tg E R E E R T + D - +
- - b ,
= = b b t t A A rr tg tg E gR z R T ) ( ) 1 (
2 1 + + D
- ,
= tT A ] ) 1 ( )[ )( 1 (
1 1
rr tg u ru tg tg E R E E gR z R + D - + +
- - b ,
       = tt A ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 2 1
tg tt r rr tg tg R R E E gR z R + - + + D -
- .
Substituting the above expressions in (25)-(27), we get:
tt r rr tg T R E E R T C d dT D
3 1 2 ) 1 ( ) / ( + D - =
-
q q ,                                            (28)
0 ) / ( = q d dt D ,                                           (29)
= ) / ( q b d d D ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [
1 2 2 3 2 1
tt u ru r tg tt r rr tg T R E E E R T R E E R T C
- - + - + D b q .        (30)16
From (28) and (29) it is clear that an increase in the perception parameter  q
unambiguously raises the amount of aid  ( 0 / > q d dT ), and has no effect on the emission
tax rate ( 0 / = q d dt ). Finally, the impact on the fraction of aid allocated to pollution,  b,
abatement is ambiguous. The reason for this ambiguity in the effect on  b is the same as
before.  Our assumption that a change in g does not affect Rg (Rgg=0) and the fact the
optimality requires t=-Rg together means that a change in  q has no effect on the optimal
level of t.
The effect on net emission in this case is:
)] / ( ) / ( )[ 1 ( ) / (
1 q b q b q d d T d dT R d dr tg + + D - =
-
    = tt u ru r tg T R E E E R C T D
1 3 2 1 ) 1 ( ) (
- - + D q .                                                     (31)
Since  0 < D , it is evident from the above equation that an increase in  q unambiguously
reduces net emission. Summarizing our results for the two Nash equilibrium regimes, we
state:
Proposition 2: Consider a Nash equilibrium where a donor country optimally chooses
the amount of transfer to a pollution emitting country, which sets optimally either the
fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement and/or the emission tax rate. In all cases
an increase in the perceived rate of cross-border pollution in the donor country
unambiguously raises the amount of foreign aid. In all the cases, except when the
recipient chooses only the emission tax rate, it also reduces net pollution, regardless of
its effect on either the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement or the effluent tax
rate. When the recipient country chooses only the emission tax rate, an increase in the
perception factor reduces net emission if the exogenous level of the fraction of aid
allocated to pollution abatement is lower than or equal to the equilibrium level.
 4. Concluding Remarks
A dominant issue in current economic policy debates is the interaction between
international trade and negative cross-border environmental externalities due to increased17
production of pollution-intensive goods, and due to the use of environmentally unfriendly
production technologies. This negative link allegedly has been exacerbated because of the
recent surge in the volume of international trade and because of the conscious and
systematic efforts by international institution, organizations, and many countries to
liberalize the international mobility of commodities and factors of production. To limit
the damaging impact of cross-border pollution, the affected countries often use threat of
trade sanction to persuade the pollution-generating countries to get their acts together.
However, following a number of very high profile international summits --- the latest one
being the 1997 summit in Kyoto --- the developed countries have been advised to take a
less combative approach and follow a "carrots" rather than "sticks" approach to cross-
border pollution.
Motivated by such aspects of the recent environmental agreements, we develop a
two-country model with income transfers, transboundary pollution, and co-existence of
private and public abatement. We find that, even in the absence of international
cooperation, cross-border pollution can reduce the total amount of net pollution emission
by inducing more international transfer, which in turn brings about more sensible
pollution policies in the polluting country. In this respect the fact that the externalities
associated with pollution often knows no international border, is a blessing in disguise.
Appendix A: The Matrix System of Changes in the Variable
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